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a b s t r a c t
We examine the impact of corporate social disclosure (CSD) on
investment behavior in the US, Japan, France, and Sweden using
stakeholder theory as the underlying framework for our analysis.
We ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant difference in investors’ reactions
to CSD across countries. Using a unique stakeholder scale we also
ﬁnd that these reactions are related to the investors’ stakeholder
orientation. These ﬁndings provide insight into cross-national differences in the perceived relevance of CSD to investors.
Ó 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In recent years, while some researchers have examined the determinants of corporate social disclosure (CSD) others have studied the implications of CSD (e.g., economic performance, investment
behavior). However, there are few studies that have attempted to bridge these two streams of literature. Additionally, in spite of documented variations in CSD among countries, much of the theoretical
CSD research is conﬁned to a domestic context (van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Aerts et al., 2007 are
exceptions).
In this study, we attempt to bridge the literature on determinants and implications of CSD by
examining the impact of CSD on investment behavior in a cross-national context using stakeholder
theory as the underlying framework for our analysis. van der Laan Smith et al. (2005), using stakeholder theory as the basis for their analysis, demonstrate that differences in institutional factors
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(e.g., culture) are signiﬁcant in explaining the perceived relevance of stakeholders and the variation in
CSD across countries. Experimental CSD studies (Belkaoui, 1980; Chan and Milne, 1999) document
that CSD impacts investment decisions although their ﬁndings are mixed and are obtained from single-country studies. We bridge these two streams of research by validating and extending prior research using stakeholder theory to examine how differences in the perceived relevance of
stakeholders inﬂuence the impact of CSD on investor behavior.
A major challenge in bridging these two streams of research is that instruments that were developed to measure societal values (e.g., Hofstede indices) have been used by researchers to study the
cross-national determinants of CSD; however instruments that focus on the potential investor perspective are more appropriate for studying the implications of CSD on investment decisions. To
overcome this challenge, we develop a stakeholder scale to measure potential investor’s beliefs
about the extent to which they value corporate social responsibility. The measures obtained from
our stakeholder scale are consistent with that documented in prior research. We use the stakeholder scale to conduct an experiment to examine the effect of the introduction of CSD on the short
and long-term investment behavior of participants from the US, Japan, Sweden, and France. We select these countries based on an assessment of cultural differences that would likely lead to divergent perceptions on the legitimacy and importance of different stakeholder groups. We ﬁnd that
CSD signiﬁcantly impacts the participants’ investment behavior within each country. Additionally,
we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant, systematic national difference in investors’ reactions to positive
CSD.
Our study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, we validate van der Laan
Smith et al. (2005) by demonstrating the generalizability of stakeholder theory to analyze cross-national differences in CSD. Second, we bridge the literature on determinants and implications of CSD
by providing a direct link between stakeholder expectations and investment behavior. Third, we develop and present a stakeholder scale that measures the importance of corporate social responsibility
to individual investors. Our stakeholder scale is consistent with cultural expectations reported in prior
research and provides an alternative valid instrument that measures the value placed on corporate social responsibility from an individual rather than a societal perspective.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the theoretical background and forms the basis for four hypotheses exploring the relationships between country, stakeholder views, and investment behavior. The
sample, experimental design, and data collection procedures are discussed in Section 3. The results
are presented and discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 provides concluding comments.

2. Background and hypotheses development
Extant cross-national studies on CSD (Fekrat et al., 1996; Freedman and Stagliano, 1992; Gamble
et al., 1996; Meek et al., 1995; Newson and Deegan, 2002) examine different time periods, types of
CSD, and countries and ﬁnd signiﬁcant variations in CSD across countries. These studies are primarily
descriptive in nature and a theoretical understanding of these observed cross-national differences is in
the developmental stage. Triandis (1995) ﬁnds that cultural factors inﬂuence national expectations of
corporate responsibility. van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) combine institutional factors, including culture, and use stakeholder theory to explain cross-national differences in the level and quality of CSD.
In this paper, we extend van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) and argue that institutional variations inﬂuence perceptions of the relevance and role of stakeholders in framing expectations regarding corporate
responsibilities to engage in CSD. We contend that from a cross-national perspective these institutional variations are most divergent and stakeholder theory provides a basis for predicting the impact
of CSD on investment behavior.
The stakeholder concept is intended to ‘‘broaden management’s vision of its roles and responsibilities beyond the proﬁt maximization functions to include interests and claims of non-stockholding
groups” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 855). Stakeholder theory is the basis for a strategic management model that purports that the effective company will identify and manage important relationships (Freeman, 1999). Stakeholder theory systematically seeks to identify which stakeholder groups deserve
the most attention of managers. The premise underlying our study is that societal values shape indi-
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vidual beliefs about the role of the corporation and the importance of different stakeholder groups in a
country. These stakeholder beliefs inﬂuence the reporting practices (e.g., CSD) of organizations and the
behavior of individuals (e.g., investment decisions). Thus, the cross-national variations in CSD practices and reactions of individuals to disclosed CSD are related to a culturally derived view of the stakeholders of the corporation. Jones et al. (2007) identify and discuss the concept of a stakeholder culture
construct at the organizational level. We investigate if there is an identiﬁable stakeholder culture construct at the country level. We select participants for our study from countries that display cross-national variations in culture.1
Hofstede (1980, p. 25) deﬁnes culture as the ‘‘collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group from another”. Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of human values (individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity)
have been widely used in the literature to classify countries according to cultural constructs. Our
four countries, Japan, Sweden, France, and the US, reside in distinct cultural areas as identiﬁed by
Hofstede (1980, 2001) and in a recently published study, the Global Leadership and Organizational
Behavior Effectiveness Research Program (GLOBE) study of societies (House et al., 2004).2 Similarly,
cultural differences documented by the World Values Survey, an academic project ongoing since
the early 1980s and updated every 5 years, are fairly signiﬁcant among the four countries in certain
dimensions (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). For example, in the traditional/secular dimension, the extent to which a society emphasizes traditional as opposed to secular and rational values, Japan
and Sweden cluster together fairly closely but there are signiﬁcant differences among Japan/Sweden,
France, and US. All these studies suggest that cultural differences are quite signiﬁcant between the
four countries.
Extant literature also examines the consequences of CSD. Researchers have examined the relationship between CSD and economic performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) and analyst’s forecasts
(Aerts et al., 2007). The ﬁndings of these studies generally suggest that CSD is desirable and valued
by investors. Experimental CSD studies (Belkaoui, 1980; Chan and Milne, 1999; Hendricks, 1976) directly examine the impact of CSD on the investment behavior of individuals. These studies ﬁnd that
CSD impacts investment decisions and is affected by the investors’ background and beliefs, although
their ﬁndings on the direction of the impact are mixed. Chan and Milne (1999) and Belkaoui (1980)
also ﬁnd that the investment strategy, short or long-term, impacts the investment decision. Differences in time frames, samples, and research design may explain some of the mixed results reported
in extant literature.3 Additionally, all the experimental CSD studies are conﬁned to a single-country
framework. In this paper, we leverage stakeholder theory and extend van der Laan Smith et al.
(2005) to examine the impact of CSD on investment behavior across countries. To bridge the two literatures – determinants of CSD (e.g., van der Laan Smith et al., 2005) and impact of CSD on investor
behavior (e.g., Chan and Milne, 1999; Belkaoui, 1980), we develop a unique stakeholder scale that measures the relative importance investors place on corporate social responsibility. Our stakeholder scale
is distinct from other proxies, such as the Hofstede indices, used in the literature in that it measures
the relative importance of corporate social responsibility from an individual investor perspective rather
than a societal perspective. Use of the stakeholder scale also represents an improvement in the instrumentation used in the literature and helps to resolve the mixed ﬁndings of prior CSD experimental
studies.

1

Our four sample countries also belong to distinct legal families (La Porta et al., 1998).
van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) identify Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimension as particularly relevant in measuring the
importance placed on corporate social responsibility. Because feminine societies emphasize nurturance issues (relationship,
cooperation, and environment) reﬂecting concern for a broader set of social issues than the narrower focus on assertiveness issues
(earnings and advancement) found in masculine societies, there should be a stronger stakeholder orientation in feminine societies
than masculine societies. Our sample countries exhibit wide variance in terms of their scores on the masculinity/femininity
dimension.
3
Hendricks (1976) and Belkaoui (1980) focus on very speciﬁc environmental disclosures namely human resource and pollution
cost information that are quantiﬁable and reported in the ﬁnancial statements or footnotes. Chan and Milne (1999) focus on
broader constructs of environmental information but their study is conducted in New Zealand where they argue the emphasis on
environmental reporting has been rather low which in part explains the weak results they obtain for some aspects of their study.
2
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3. Hypotheses
We develop and test four hypotheses to validate the stakeholder scale that we introduce and to
replicate and extend prior research on the determinants and impact of CSD on investment behavior.
Given that our experiment is structured such that the participants are from countries from different cultural clusters, we expect the impact of CSD will be different for the four countries. However,
given the ﬁndings from the Belkaoui (1980), Chan and Milne (1999), and Hendricks (1976) studies
we anticipate that CSD will be relevant to investors within each country. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1. Positive CSD will affect short and long-term stock investment decisions.
Our second hypothesis seeks to deﬁne the conceptual basis for CSD and to provide insight into the
mixed ﬁndings of prior studies. We develop a stakeholder scale to measure the stakeholder orientation
of the participants. We anticipate that there will be a relationship between this scale and the investment decision. We hypothesize:
H2. The impact of CSD on the investment decision of individuals will be positively related to their
scores on the stakeholder scale.
Based on our discussion of stakeholder theory, we argue that institutional factors such as culture
shape societal expectations regarding corporate responsibilities to engage in CSD. The observed differences in cross-national CSD practices identiﬁed in prior research (van der Laan Smith et al.,2005; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Gamble et al., 1996; Fekrat et al., 1996; Meek et al., 1995; Freedman and
Stagliano, 1992) are the result of differences in societal expectations. These differences will be reﬂected in the stakeholder orientation of the investors and will manifest themselves in investors’ decisions regarding CSD. This gives rise to our third and fourth hypotheses:
H3. Countries with different institutional frameworks will have different Stakeholder Scores.
H4. The country of the investor will signiﬁcantly affect the impact of CSD on the investment
decision.
Hypotheses 1 and 4 replicate and extend prior research on determinants and impact of CSD on
investor behavior, while hypotheses 2 and 3 also validate our stakeholder scale.4
4. Methodology
4.1. Experimental design
This experiment uses a within-subject (repeated-measures design) conducted with one group from
each of the countries in the study. The within-subject design removes the variability caused by individual differences among the participants. This makes the design more powerful while also requiring
fewer subjects than completely randomized designs (Stevens, 2002). The cause/effect relationship between the conceptual variables and their operational deﬁnitions is presented in Fig. 1 using Libby’s
(1981) ‘‘predictive validity framework.”
As shown in Fig. 1, culture, an independent variable, affects Stakeholder Beliefs, an intervening
independent variable. Both of these concepts affect the investment decision, the dependent variable.
Culture was operationalized by selecting participants for the experiment from countries with divergent cultures. Stakeholder Beliefs are measured using a stakeholder scale. The effect on the investment
decision is operationalized as the change in investment that occurs after the introduction of CSD.
4
Given the exploratory nature of the study and the newness of the theoretical framework adopted, we do not provide speciﬁc
predictions on the relative impact of culture on stakeholder scores or the relative magnitude of the impact of CSD on investors’
behavior across our sample countries in our hypotheses.
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Independent Variables
Culture

Moderating
Variables

Dependent Variable
1

Conceptual

Stakeholder
Beliefs

2

Investment
Decision

8
3

Operational
Definition

Operational

1. France
2. Japan
3. Sweden
4. U.S.

6

4

5

Operational
Definition

Operational
Definition

Score on
Stakeholder
scale

7

8

1. Type of
CSD
Information
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Years of
Education
5. Years of
Business
Experience

Change in
investment that
occurs after
CSD.

Fig. 1. Conceptual network. Source: Adapted from Libby (1981).
Table 1
Participant demographics. This table presents frequencies on the gender, age and work experience of the participants. (Sample
sizes presented here and in the following tables vary based on the number of responding participants).
US (n = 54)

Japan (n = 68)

Sweden (n = 33)

France (n = 36)

Gender
Male
Female
Age group
20–29
30–39
40–49
50 or older

65%
35%

78%
22%

79%
21%

53%
47%

61%
32%
7%
0

66%
16%
9%
9%

55%
42%
3%
0

94%
0
6%
0

Work experience
Less than 1 year
1–3 years
4–5 years
6–10 years
More than 10 years

8%
22%
22%
22%
26%

44%
13%
12%
12%
19%

12%
21%
24%
31%
12%

81%
13%
0
6%
0

Other factors (type of CSD, gender, age, education, and years of experience) identiﬁed in prior research
as having an effect on investment decisions serve as moderating variables. The design of this experiment allows for the control of the effect of these extraneous variables.
4.2. Participants
The study participants are graduate business students from the US, France, Sweden, and Japan.
Graduate students are recognized as appropriate surrogates for general investors in experimental research in ﬁnancial accounting.5 Using students in the same area of study from the four countries also
mitigates sample equivalence concerns inherent in cross-national research. Professors from the four
countries administered the experiment to graduate business students at their universities.6 The ﬁnal
sample for this study is composed of 54 participants from the US, 68 from Japan, 33 from Sweden,
and 36 from France. We present the demographic data in Table 1.
4.3. The experiment
This experiment is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst section consists of background and
ﬁnancial accounting information (Net Sales, Net Income, Total Assets, Earnings per Share on
5
6

See Libby et al. (2002) for a comprehensive list of experimental ﬁnancial accounting studies that employed student subjects.
Institutional approval for the use of human participants was received as required.
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Common Stock, and Cash Dividends Paid) on two ﬁrms, Company A and Company B. The ﬁnancial
information is provided for a ﬁve-year period for the ﬁrms and is similar except that Company A’s
Net Income and Earnings per Share on Common Stock is less than Company B’s by 6–8% per year.
After reviewing the ﬁnancial information, the participants are asked to allocate a total of $100,000
between the two ﬁrms under a short-term strategy, deﬁned as investing for speculative proﬁt, and a
long-term investment strategy, deﬁned as investing for long-term share ownership. After completing
the initial investment decision the participants are instructed to proceed to the second part of the
experiment.
The second part consists of additional footnote disclosure (CSD) describing the proactive environmental and labor practices and policies of Company A which require it to adhere to internationally
recognized labor and environmental standards regardless of whether they are required in the countries in which it operates. These two forms of CSD were chosen since they relate to two identiﬁable
categories of stakeholders, employees which are considered primary or normative stakeholders and
the environment a secondary or derivative stakeholder group (Clarkson, 1995; Phillips, 2003). The
information also explicitly states that Company A’s higher operating costs are a result of these policies. After reviewing the additional disclosure the participants are asked to again allocate the
$100,000 in equity investment between the two ﬁrms under a short and long-term investment
strategy.
The last section of the experiment consists of demographic questions (gender, age, nationality, and
work experience), a manipulation check question, and six perceptual questions the results of which
form the stakeholder scale. Additionally, three English language comprehension questions are included in the non-US versions of the experiment.
As an internal validity check, we pre-tested the experiment with 21 graduate students from the US.
The experiment was administered to the participants and then repeated approximately 1 month later
with the same participants. The students who participated in this preliminary testing were not included in the ﬁnal sample of US students. Results of the paired samples t-test indicate that there
was no statistically signiﬁcant difference in the means between the two administrations of the experiment. These ﬁndings allow us to attribute the change in investment in this experiment to the introduction of the CSD.
The experiment was translated into Japanese and French using translators in the US and back translated by professors from Japan and France. The participants in France and Japan were offered the
choice of reading the materials in English; however, all of the participants chose to complete the
French and Japanese versions, respectively. The professor from Sweden indicated that the Swedish
graduate business students were ﬂuent in English and translation was unnecessary. The results of
the English language check questions completed by the Swedish participants are consistent with this
observation.

4.4. Stakeholder scale
There are no existing instruments available to measure the stakeholder construct at the investor
level (Kwok and Sharp, 1998), therefore we constructed a stakeholder scale. Based on a review of
the literature, we developed 14 questions each representing either a stakeholder orientation or a
shareholder orientation. The questions were pre-tested with students from the US with the participants’ responses measured on a 5-point Likert scale. The 14 questions were reduced to a ﬁve-item
scale using factor analysis. Reliability analysis conducted on this ﬁve-item scale resulted in an alpha
of .70.
To assess if investors would be willing to accept a lower ﬁnancial return if a company maintained a
proactive social responsibility policy, an additional question was added to the ﬁve items representing
the stakeholder construct. The resulting stakeholder scale (Appendix A) consists of six Likert scaled
items designed to measure the respondents’ stakeholder orientation.
We used the optimal scaling technique to test for construct equivalence of our scale across
countries. Optimal scaling is a form of factor analysis recommended for use in assessing measurement equivalence in cross-national research (Batista-Foguet et al., 2004; Mullen, 1995; Shen and
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Table 2
Stakeholder Score – descriptive statistics. This table presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum statistics, and
Cronbach’s alpha on the Stakeholder Score by country.

Mean
Standard deviation
Maximum score (30)
Minimum score (6)
Cronbach’s alpha

US (n = 53)

Japan (n = 62)

Sweden (n = 33)

France (n = 35)

20.2
3.9
28.0
9.0
.734

22.1
3.2
28.0
14.0
.617

21.3
4.1
29.0
13.0
.738

21.2
3.3
29.0
16.0
.641

Table 3
Investment behavior – descriptive statistics. This table presents the mean (standard deviation in parentheses) of the amount
invested in company, the CSD Company, and the investment changea by country (000’s omitted).
US (n = 53)

Japan (n = 60)

Sweden (n = 33)

France (n = 36)

Short-term
Part A
29 (19)
29 (24)
18 (17)
28 (17)
Part B
37 (26)
34 (22)
42 (35)
36 (23)
Long-term
Part A
37 (20)
47 (21)
35 (21)
45 (13)
Part B
55 (26)
65 (23)
62 (32)
57 (20)
Investment change – The mean and (standard deviation) for the short-term and long-term investment change
Short-term
8.9 (23.0)
5.0 (20.1)
23.2 (33.3)
7.5 (16.0)
Long-term
19.2 (27.5)
17.2 (22.8)
26.7 (26.9)
12.2 (19.2)
a

The investment change is calculated as the amount invested in Company A in Part B of the experiment less the amount
invested in Company A in Part A of the experiment.

Lai, 1998). The results (unreported) suggest an adequate measurement model and construct
equivalence.7
The stakeholder scale score (Stakeholder Score) is the summation of the responses to the six, 5point Likert scaled questions in Part C of the experiment (see Appendix). A cross-national analysis
of the factor loadings on the stakeholder construct for each of the six questions did not reveal a
consistent pattern in the strength of the loadings across countries. Based on this observation, a
non-weighted summation of the Likert scale responses for the composite score was used. The scale
was anchored with strongly disagree as 1 and strongly agree as 5.8
Descriptive statistics on the Stakeholder Scores for each country are reported in Table 2. The mean
values of the Stakeholder Scores are consistent across countries. The reliability estimates are above .70
for the US and Sweden and above .60 for Japan and France. These reliability estimates are acceptable
given the purpose of this experiment and that this is the ﬁrst testing of the Stakeholder Scale outside
of the US (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991).
5. Results
Descriptive statistics on the investment change variable are presented in Table 3 for each country.
A positive (negative) investment change indicates that there was an increase (decrease) in investment
in the CSD Company. As shown in Table 3, the participants’ mean investment, across all countries, for
both the short and long-term horizons is positive indicating an increase in investment after introduction of the CSD. Sweden has the largest mean change in investment on a short-term investment horizon followed by the US, France, and Japan. Sweden also had the largest mean change in investment on
a long-term horizon followed by the US, Japan, and France.
7

As an additional test of measurement equivalence, the optimally scaled values were compared across countries for response
pattern similarity as recommended by Mullen (1995). Taken as a whole, the response patterns in each of the countries are similar
providing further indication of measurement equivalence in the stakeholder scale.
8
One question was worded such that a strongly agree response expressed a shareholder orientation, so it was reverse coded for
determining the Stakeholder Score.
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Table 4
MANOVA within-country investment changes. Test of H1.
US (n = 52)

Japan (n = 51)

Sweden (n = 33)

France (n = 34)

.000*** (14.852)

.000*** (16.092)

.000*** (9.864)

Panel B: Results of the short-term and long-term ANOVA models
Short-term
0.007*** (7.820)
.122 (2.479)
.000*** (27.526)
Long-term
.000*** (25.396)

.000*** (15.990)
.000*** (32.461)

.006*** (8.773)
.001*** (13.747)

a

Panel A: Results of the MANOVA model
.000*** (12.506)

Panel A presents the p values (F-statistics) for the intercept from the MANOVA performed jointly on the short-term and longterm investment changes for each country independently.
Panel B presents the p values (F-statistics) for the intercepts from the ANOVAs performed separately on the short-term and
long-term investment changes for each country independently.
a
The sample size may vary since some participants did not complete both the short-term and long-term investment decisions for both Part A and Part B of the experiment.
***
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .01 based on Pillai’s trace multivariate test.

5.1. Manipulation checks
The manipulation check question asked the participants to identify the CSD Company. The percentage of participants correctly identifying the Company by country is as follows: US 98%; Japan 92.5%;
Sweden 100%; and France 100%.9 These results indicate an understanding of the treatment. As an additional manipulation check the participants’ responses to the survey question, ‘‘I would be willing to accept a lower return on my investment in a company if that company maintained a proactive social
responsibility policy” were compared to the amount of the participant’s long-term investment change.
Results of the correlation analysis conﬁrm a positive relationship between the response to this question
and the investment change in all of the countries providing further evidence that the participants understood the experiment.

5.2. Hypotheses testing
5.2.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1
To test if the positive CSD affected the investment decision (H1), a MANOVA model was performed
for each country independently, using both short and long-term investment changes as dependent
variables. The moderating variables were not included in this model since the within-subjects design
of the experiment holds these variables constant. The changes were calculated by subtracting the
amount invested in the CSD Company, in Part A of the experiment from the amount invested in the
CSD Company in Part B. Within the MANOVA model the intercept estimates the overall mean change
for a country. H1 is supported by the data if the overall mean change, as represented by the intercept,
is signiﬁcantly different from zero indicating that a signiﬁcant change in investment occurred as a result of the introduction of CSD. As shown in Table 4, Panel A, the intercept is signiﬁcant (p < .01) for all
countries. These results support H1 and suggest that the impact of CSD on the investment decision is
quite strong given that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant results in each of the four countries. Prior research conducted on a single country level (Belkaoui, 1980; Chan and Milne, 1999; Hendricks, 1976) found that
CSD inﬂuenced investment behavior. However, while the prior ﬁndings on the direction of the change
in investment behavior were mixed (Chan and Milne, 1999) our results show that positive CSD inﬂuenced the investor to increase their investment in the disclosing company.
Given the ﬁndings of signiﬁcance in the MANOVA models, ANOVA was performed for each country
independently on the mean short and long-term investment changes to determine if one or both
Investment Behavior variables are signiﬁcant. The results of the ANOVA tests are presented in Table
4, Panel B. The intercept is signiﬁcant (p < .01) in the short-term model for Sweden, France, and the
US and is signiﬁcant (p < .01) in the long-term model for each of the four countries.
9
Participants who failed the manipulation check question were excluded from the reported ﬁndings. The inferences from our
analysis do not change when those participants are included or excluded in the analysis.
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The short-term results are informative since they may be more reﬂective of the stakeholder orientation than the long-term results. The experiment was structured such that there was a ﬁnancial cost
(the lower return) associated with the CSD company’s socially responsible practices that in the shortterm the participant would not recoup, whereas in the long-term alternative explanations for the
investment behavior could conceivably be used to explain the results (e.g., investment for takeover
possibilities). Focusing on the short-term results we ﬁnd that they mirror the countries’ rankings on
Hofstede’s masculinity–femininity dimension. Sweden, ranked the most feminine country, demonstrated the greatest impact followed by France, the US, and lastly by Japan, which is ranked the most
masculine country.
5.2.2. Test of Hypothesis 2
H2 states that the impact of CSD on the investment decisions of individuals is related to their Stakeholder Score. H2 was tested using a MANCOVA model, for each country independently, with the short
and long-term investment changes as dependent variables. Stakeholder Score was included as the
covariate in the model. The MANCOVA model did not include the age, gender, and work experience
moderating variables as these variables did not have a signiﬁcant main effect or two-way interaction
effect and decreased the power of the analysis when included in the model. These and follow up analyses using ANCOVA are presented in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, Panel A, Stakeholder Score is signiﬁcant for the US and Sweden at the p < .01
level in the MANCOVA model and in the short and long-term ANCOVA models. Stakeholder Score is
signiﬁcant at the p < .10 level for France in the long-term ANCOVA model. As an additional test of
the relationship between the Stakeholder Score and Investment Behavior variables a correlation analysis was conducted between Stakeholder Score and the short and long-term investment changes.
These results, presented in Table 5, Panel B, reveal a signiﬁcant (p < .01, 1-tailed) relationship between
short and long-term investment change and Stakeholder Score in the US and Sweden and a signiﬁcant
(p < .05, 1-tailed) relationship between long-term investment change and Stakeholder Score in France.
We conducted OLS regression analyses to verify that the observed signiﬁcant effect for the Stakeholder Score was in the direction hypothesized (positive) i.e., an increase in investment is associated
with a higher Stakeholder Score implying a stakeholder orientation. The Stakeholder Score was regressed on the investment change variables for each country independently with gender, age, and
Table 5
Relationship between Stakeholder Score and investment changes. Test of H2.
US (n = 52)

Japan (n = 51)

Sweden (n = 33)

Panel A: Results of the MANCOVA model and short-term and long-term ANCOVA models
MANCOVA
.607 (.505)
.009*** (5.463)
Intercept
.011** (4.950)
***
(8.321)
.217 (1.575)
.001*** (9.701)
Stakeholder Score
.001
Short-term ANCOVA
.582 (.308)
.002*** (11.269)
Intercept
.004*** (9.115)
***
(13.423)
.439 (.608)
.000*** (19.031)
Stakeholder Score
.001
Long-term ANCOVA
.413 (.682)
.128 (2.448)
Intercept
.044** (4.281)
Stakeholder Score
.003*** (9.863)
.121 (2.494)
.009*** (7.718)
US

Japan

Sweden

Panel B: Results of the correlation analysis of Stakeholder Score and Investment Change
.113 (.203)
.000*** (.617)
Short-term change and Stakeholder Score
.000*** (.460)
***
(.406)
.202 (.074)
.005*** (.446)
Long-term change and Stakeholder Score
.001

France (n = 33)

.469 (.775)
.193 (1.741)
.857 (.033)
.551 (.364)
.216 (1.595)
.076* (3.376)
France
.202 (.146)
.038** (.313)

Panel A presents the p values (F-statistics) from the MANCOVA performed jointly on the short-term and long-term investment
changes and the ANCOVA performed separately on the short-term change and long-term investment change for each country.
Adjustment was made for the Stakeholder Score.
Panel B presents the 1-tailed p values (Pearson correlation coefﬁcients) obtained from the correlation analysis of Stakeholder
Score and short-term change and Stakeholder Score and long-term change.
*
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .10, based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.
**
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .05, based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.
***
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .01 based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.
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work experience included as moderating variables. No directional relationship has been hypothesized
for the moderating variables. Table 6, Panel A presents the results of the short-term regression model
and Panel B presents the results of the long-term regression model. As shown, the Stakeholder Score
coefﬁcient estimates are positive, as predicted, for each of the countries in both the short-term and
long-term regression models indicating that an increase in investment in the CSD company is associated with a higher Stakeholder Score. The results are signiﬁcant at the p < .01 level for the US and Sweden in both regression models and at the p < .10 level for France in the long-term model.
We ﬁnd consistent results when we compare the regression models with the MANCOVA/ANCOVA
models. In both models, the relationship between Stakeholder Score and the investment variables is
Table 6
Regression analysis results – additional test of H2.
Variable

Predicted sign

Coefﬁcient estimate
Unstandardized

Panel A – Short-term investment change
Co A Short-term change = b + b score + b gender + b age + b work experience
US
Score
+
2.725
Gender
?
6.038
Age
?
7.827
Work experience
?
5.181
Japan
Score
+
.760
Gender
?
7.271
Age
?
6.164
Work experience
?
4.119
Sweden
Score
+
6.120
Gender
?
16.175
Age
?
20.111
Work experience
?
14.073
France
Score
+
1.381
Gender
?
.278
Age
?
.666
Work experience
?
6.168
Panel B – Long-term investment change
Co A Long-term change = b + b score + b gender + b age + b work experience
US
Score
+
2.923
Gender
?
11.502
Age
?
7.858
Work experience
?
2.748
Japan
Score
+
1.561
Gender
?
6.349
Age
?
.852
Work experience
?
3.391
Sweden
Score
+
3.871
Gender
?
18.103
Age
?
1.250
Work experience
?
5.392
France
Score
+
2.037
Gender
?
2.431
Age
?
16.680
Work experience
?
6.601
*
**
***

Signiﬁcant at p<.10.
Signiﬁcant at p<.05.
Signiﬁcant at p<.01.

t-statistic
Standardized

.461
.125
.219
.294

3.565***
.971
1.276
1.754*

.116
.158
.300
.345

.842
1.104
1.237
1.390

.751
.202
.342
.521

4.645***
1.235
1.508
2.385**

.288
.008
.020
.293

1.337
.043
.044
.643

.412
.198
.183
.130

3.065***
1.483
1.027
.746

.223
.118
.033
.243

1.618
.838
.136
.986

.588
.280
.026
.247

3.159***
1.486
.101
.982

.409
.071
.494
.309

2.064*
.388
1.176
.736
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only signiﬁcant (p < .05) in the US and Sweden. The absence of ﬁndings for Japan and the mixed ﬁndings for France in both sets of models may be due to measurement error, note that Japan and France
had lower reliability estimates than the US and Sweden on the stakeholder scale (see Table 2). While
the results of our tests provide only partial support for H2, we believe that overall they do suggest that
stakeholder beliefs are related to investment behavior. Additionally, the results also provide support
for our stakeholder scale as a valid measure of the importance of social responsibility to a culture at
the individual level.
5.2.3. Tests of Hypothesis 3
Conceptually, the institutional environment is hypothesized to affect stakeholder beliefs. H3 follows this premise and purports that there will be cross-national differences in the Stakeholder Scores
reﬂective of the differences in institutional environments. As shown in Table 2, the mean Stakeholder
Score for the US is 20.2, Japan is 22.1, Sweden is 21.3, and France is 21.2.
To determine if there are statistically signiﬁcant differences in these scores an ANOVA model with
the Stakeholder Score as the dependent variable, including country as a factor was used to test this
hypothesis. Age, gender, and work experience were included as moderating variables. The model
was constructed to include two-way interactions. Due to the composition of the sample data and
the lack of variability, three way interactions could not be calculated. The results, presented in Table
7, reveal that country had a signiﬁcant (p < .01) effect on the Stakeholder Score indicating signiﬁcant
cross-national differences in stakeholder beliefs. This ﬁnding supports H3 providing evidence suggesting that the stakeholder concept is a valid theoretical framework for evaluating CSD implications consistent with the ﬁndings from van der Laan Smith et al. (2005). Additionally, support for H3 also
suggests that our stakeholder scale is consistent with cultural expectations reported in prior research.
Gender also had a signiﬁcant (p = .05) main effect and a signiﬁcant (p < .05) interaction effect with
country indicating that there is a signiﬁcant difference in the Stakeholder Scores in these countries between males and females. Further examination of the gender variable (not shown in Table 7) revealed
that the mean Stakeholder Score for females is statistically higher (p < .01) than for males in Sweden
implying that there may be cultural differences associated with gender.
5.2.4. Test of Hypothesis 4
If stakeholder beliefs inﬂuence investment behavior and these beliefs are inﬂuenced by culture as
hypothesized, we should ﬁnd signiﬁcant, cross-national differences in the impact of CSD on investment
behavior (H4). A MANCOVA model was constructed to test this hypothesis. It included the short and
long-term investment changes as the dependent variables, the intercept, Country as a factor, and Stakeholder Score as a covariate. Age, gender, and work experience were included as moderating variables.
Table 7
Test of Stakeholder Scores – cross-national. Test of H3.
Results of the ANOVA model
Intercept
Country
Gender
Age
Exp.
Country*gender
Country*age
Country*Exp.
Gender*age
Gender*Exp.
Age*Exp.

.000*** (735.38)
.007*** (4.229)
.050** (3.909)
.482 (.826)
.694 (.608)
.017** (3.490)
.052* (2.413)
.668 (.744)
.527 (.643)
.360 (1.106)
.103 (2.100)

This panel presents the p values (F-statistic for the intercept and the country factor) from the ANOVA performed on the
Stakeholder Scores. Country (the US, Japan, Sweden, and France) is the factor of interest. Age, gender, and work experience
(Exp.) were treated as ﬁxed factors.
*
Denotes signiﬁcance at p < .10.
**
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .05.
***
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .01.
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Table 8
Cross-national test of investment changes. Test of H4.
Independent Variablesa
Intercept
Country
Stakeholder Score
Gender
Age
Work Experience
Gender*age
Gender*work experience
Gender*country
Age*work experience
Age*country
Work experience*country

MANCOVA (n = 165)b
***

(4.976)
.009
.046** (2.174)
.000*** (12.555)
.769 (.263)
.677 (.666)
.243 (1.280)
.077* (2.142)
.703 (.723)
.993 (.124)
.433 (.990)
.958 (.230)
.192 (1.295)

Short-term ANCOVA
**

.024 (5.231)
.049** (2.696)
.001*** (11.312)
.489 (.482)
.457 (.874)
.274 (1.287)
.276 (1.303)
.976 (.161)
.944 (.127)
.330 (1.156)
.938 (.200)
.394 (1.065)

Long-term ANCOVA
.009*** (6.983)
.046** (2.376)
.000*** (19.295)
.714 (.135)
.713 (.456)
.204 (1.474)
.053* (3.007)
.343 (1.141)
.916 (.171)
.536 (.730)
.855 (.334)
.138 (1.555)

This table presents the p values (F-statistic) from the MANCOVA with short-term and long-term investment changes as the
dependent variables (DVs). Country is the independent variable. Age, gender, and work experience (Exp.) were treated as ﬁxed
factors in the MANCOVA. Adjustment was made for the Stakeholder Score. The short-term and long-term ANCOVAs are also
presented.
a
Three-way interactions are not presented because of the difﬁculty with interpretability due to sample size and composition.
b
The sample size may vary since some participants did not complete both the short-term and long-term investment decisions for both Part A and Part B of the experiment.
*
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .10, based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.
**
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .05, based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.
***
Denotes signiﬁcant at p < .01, based on Pillai’s trace for the multivariate test.

The results of the test of H4 are presented in Table 8. As shown, the Country variable is signiﬁcant
(p < .05) indicating a cross-national difference in investors’ reactions to positive CSD. This result supports H4.
The Stakeholder Score is also signiﬁcant (p < .01) indicating a relationship between the Stakeholder
Score and Investment Changes consistent with the results of H2. The moderating variables did not reveal a signiﬁcant main effect. There was an interaction effect (p < .10) between gender and age in the
MANCOVA and further analysis revealed that that younger, male participants had a larger mean
change in investment than older, male participants and the opposite was found for the female participants. However, the limited sample size and lack of variability in the gender and age variables within
our sample make it difﬁcult to make reliable inferences from the interaction effects.
We conducted follow up analysis of the Investment Behavior variables using ANCOVA with the intercept, Country factor, and Stakeholder Score as a covariate. Age, gender, and work experience were included
as moderating variables. As shown in Table 8, the results revealed that the country factor did have a signiﬁcant effect in the short-term and long-term models (p < .05). These results indicate that the cross-national difference in investors’ reactions to positive CSD is discernable on both the short-term and longterm investment horizon. These results are consistent with our ﬁndings for H1. Stakeholder Score is also
signiﬁcant (p < .01) in both the short and long-term ANCOVA models. These ﬁndings support H3; the country of the investor affects the impact of CSD on the investment decision. The moderating variables did not
reveal a signiﬁcant main effect. There was an interaction effect (p < .10) between gender and age in the
long-term ANCOVA, see the previous discussion of the MANCOVA model for the analysis of this effect.
5.2.5. Robustness test
The within-subject design of our experiment may have inﬂuenced the participants to react positively to the CSD and increase their investment in the disclosing company for reasons other than their
stakeholder orientation. For example, the participants may have guessed the purpose of the study when
they read the CSD and reacted to experimental pressures or may have reacted to cultural pressures.
Therefore, as a robustness test, we removed the participants who did not invest in the CSD Company
in the ﬁrst part of the experiment i.e., invested nothing in Company A, and then invested in it after reading the CSD. In the short-term investment scenario there were 15 participants who met these criteria, 3
from the US, 7 from Japan, 5 from Sweden, and none from France. In the long-term investment scenario
there were 12 participants who met these criteria, 4 from the US, 4 from Japan, 3 from Sweden, and 1
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from France. When we removed these participants and reran our models we found no signiﬁcant differences with our original models and our conclusions as previously discussed did not change. These
results help to mitigate the concern with the within-subject experimental design.

6. Conclusions
In this study we use stakeholder theory and argue that the role of a corporation in society and the
perception of the relative importance of its stakeholders are inﬂuenced by a country’s unique cultural
heritage. Further, a country’s stakeholder orientation affects the way in which investors react to CSD.
We examine this argument by conducting an experiment to observe the impact of the introduction of
CSD on the investment behavior of participants from four countries (US, Japan, Sweden, and France)
that we expect will exhibit signiﬁcant differences in their underlying stakeholder views.
We ﬁnd that CSD does impact investment behavior within each of the countries in our sample and
that the extent of this impact is inﬂuenced by their stakeholder orientation. Taken as a whole, the results
of our experiment suggest that there are systematic, cross-national differences in the investment response to CSD and that the stakeholder concept is useful in explaining this variation. Thus, as hypothesized, our results suggest that a country’s culture contributes to shaping expectations regarding
stakeholders which in turn inﬂuence investment behavior. Our ﬁndings highlight the promise of stakeholder theory in providing a unifying theoretical framework to study cross-national differences in CSD.
In addition, by substantiating the link between CSD and the stakeholder concept this study adds to both
the stakeholder and the CSD literature.
An important contribution of this study is the development of a unique stakeholder scale that measures the relative importance of corporate social responsibility which has not been used in the prior
literature. Our stakeholder scale provides an alternative valid instrument that captures the relative
importance placed on corporate social responsibility measured from an investor rather than a societal
perspective. The measures obtained from our stakeholder scale are consistent with cultural expectations documented in prior research.
The ﬁndings from this study should be interpreted with consideration for the following limitations.
First, the experiment in this study was developed and pre-tested in the US. The cultural norms and values from the US may have affected the design of the experiment and may be reﬂected in the phrasing of
the questions developed to measure the stakeholder construct. Second, the experiment and survey
were translated into Japanese and French. Although precautions were taken to ensure the accuracy
of the translation, there exists the possibility of misinterpretation of the stakeholder construct questions. Third, we used graduate business students as the participants in our study. While we believe that
their perceptions represent the values of a given society, an interesting extension of this research would
be to use practicing professionals as participants in a study of this nature. Fourth, the results may be
inﬂuenced by the particular conﬁguration of our sample participants, e.g., the French sample contained
the youngest and least experienced participants. While we attempted to identify and control for these
variables and to make inferences only with clear support, the possibility that our results are an artifact
of our sample is a limitation of this study. Finally, as is not uncommon in quasi-experimental research
the results of this study may not be generalizable to non experimental situations.
Notwithstanding these limitations our study provides several promising avenues of research. Our
exploratory study provides initial evidence of the link between stakeholder expectations and investment behavior. Future research could use stronger methodological designs including using investment
professionals as the target sample in examining the impact of stakeholder expectations on investment
decisions. Additionally, our stakeholder scale provides an alternative valid instrument that can be used
in future research to explore the relationship between corporate social responsibility and investment
behavior. Lastly, in our study we noted that there was an interaction effect between Stakeholder Score
and the moderating variables, age, gender, and work experience. However, given the conﬁguration of our
sample it was difﬁcult to reliably interpret the effects. Future studies could speciﬁcally explore the relationship between stakeholder orientation and the impact on ﬁnancial reporting with attention to the effect of gender, age, and work experience.
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Appendix. Stakeholder scale*
For the following questions rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement, as it
refers to you, by circling a number on the scale presented below each question.
1. A corporation’s proactive policy on social responsibility, such as labor practices and environmental
practices, would have a positive inﬂuence on my decision to invest in that corporation?

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

2. It is the responsibility of the corporation to distribute the beneﬁts and risks arising from corporate
activities among all people or groups of people that are impacted by its operations.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

3. A corporation’s primary purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

4. Corporations have a responsibility to actively monitor and take into account in their operations, the
concerns of all people or groups of people that are impacted by their operations.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree
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5. A mutual fund’s policy to invest in corporations that have an established proactive social responsibility policy would have a positive inﬂuence on my decision to invest in that mutual fund.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

6. I would be willing to accept a lower return on my investment in a company if that company maintained a proactive social responsibility policy.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

*The summation of the scores to these six questions (question 3. was reverse coded) form the
Stakeholder Score.
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